JEPP Online

Does an external shock affect public opinion about adequate internal and external border restrictions in Europe? Yes and no, is the answer from Philipp Lutz and his co-author in the recently published article “External borders and internal freedoms: how the refugee crisis shaped the bordering preferences of European citizens”. The authors argue that the irregular inflow of immigrants, understood as a failure of external exclusion, could go hand in hand with citizens’ decreasing support for free movement within Europe. According to their rationale, the external threat posed by immigration might activate feelings of national identity and fuel scepticism about the EU’s ability to guarantee the integrity of internal freedoms. Drawing on Eurobarometer data between 2012 and 2018, their findings highlight that Europeans’ long-term support for free movement has been unaffected by the refugee crisis. In contrast, after the crisis citizens became more positive about internal migration and increasingly preferred border controls at the European, rather than at their national borders. Based on these findings Philipp Lutz and Felix Karstens conclude that political elites’ fears that failure to limit irregular border crossings undermines public support for free freedom of movement within Europe or the European model as a whole is unsubstantiated.

In light of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015, the EU founded the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (‘EUTF’) to address ‘root causes’ of migration through preventive measures in countries of origin. EU policymakers adopted this framing of aid as a tool to prevent migratory movements even though it contradicts the broad academic consensus that development makes migration more likely. To understand how the misleading ‘root causes’ narrative gained political traction, Natasha Zaun and Olivia Nantermoz assess how EU policymakers created the assumption that development aid reduces migration flows in their recently published article “The use of pseudo-causal narratives in EU policies: the case of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa”. The frame analyses demonstrate that policy actors used the ‘root cause’ narrative against better evidence in order to signal that the EU actively responded to the ‘crisis’. It allowed the European Commission to rally support and reassert its legitimacy at a time when criticism over its inability to resolve the internal struggles became increasingly strong. The findings imply that even technocratic actors, which are expected to base their work on expertise and knowledge, strategically promote unwarranted causal narratives to legitimize their role politically when they are under pressure

The recently published article “Externalising internal policies via conflict: the EU’s indirect influence on international institutions” by Manuel Becker proposes an innovative causal mechanism of how the EU might – intentionally or unintentionally – compel external institutions to adjust to EU policies. Manuel Becker argues that if European regulatory policies cause important European market actors to suspend the rules and obligations of other institutions, the EU can create a conflict that undermines the effectiveness of international institutions. To dissolve this conflict, external institutions need to enable mutual compliance for European market actors by realigning its policies towards European objectives. To test this proposed mechanism, the EU’s externalization of data protection to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the externalization of European fundamental rights to the UN Security Council (UNSC) serve as cases. Process-tracing reveals that the EU has indeed leverage over international institutions’ policies under specific conditions: The European actors’ market share needs to be sufficiently important to the international institution. The UNSC e.g. adapted its policies after the European Court of Justice ruled that European private banks have to release financial assets of individuals and entities connected to Al-Qaida since the UNSC’s listing procedures violated European fundamental rights. In this case, the EU had great leverage over the functionality of the international sanctions regime as the Eurozone had by far the biggest banking sector and thus was considered a central player. Overall, the article implies that creating a vertical regulatory conflict can serve as an indirect tool of influence and can enhance the EU’s status as an independent player in international regulation.

In recent decades, voters’ support for the expansion of the welfare state has increased, as has conflict over its specific design. How have political parties adapted their policy positions in light of this transformation of political demand? In his recently published article “Congruent with whom? Parties’ issue emphases and voter preferences in welfare politics”, Michael Pinggera investigates whether parties’ social policy emphases match the preferences of partisan voters, the median voter, or both. Drawing on original data from election manifestos and individual-level survey data from seven West European countries, Michael shows that parties focus on issues that are overly supported by both partisans and the median voter. Interestingly this finding also holds for radical right parties, even though previous literature would lead to expect that they are closer to their own supporters rather than the general electorate. However, issue emphases across parties differ in line with the demands of the parties’ voters. The findings imply that while politics has become issue-based in recent years, parties still remain representatives of social groups.

A high share of EU legislative proposals is decided upon in a fast-tracked process called ‘trilogues’ taking place between representatives of the European Parliament, Council and Commission. To understand the EU’s inter-institutional negotiations, Emmy Ruiter investigates the way in which EU institutions internally prepare for these talks in her recent article “The European Parliament’s mandate for trilogues: explaining the discretion of political group advisors”. Based on interviews and a survey, Emmy demonstrates that Political Group Advisors (PGA) participate extensively in the intra-EP mandating process preceding trilogues. In particular during the early stages of co-ordination, they enjoy high levels of autonomy. Ahead of group and shadows meetings, PGAs act without well-defined instructions and base their actions on what they assume is in line with the group’s political agenda. She concludes with a normative caveat: “we need to consider the possible implications of PGAs’ autonomy for the legitimacy of EP decision-making“.

Following revelations that Germany’s largest car manufacturer had manipulated emission readings in its diesel cars, the German government’s decision to deny European owners of affected vehicles financial compensation had an arguably unforeseen and certainly unintended effect on both the German and European legal systems. In their article “Dieselgate and Eurolegalism. How a scandal fosters the Americanization of European law” published in the Journal of European Public Policy, Katharina van Elten and Britta Rehder show how the German government’s decision spurred a transnational coalition of consumer organizations and law firms to take to the courts and challenge an unfavourable political decision through legal means. Historically uncommon in a European context, such litigation strategies appeared at odds with Germany’s traditional corporatist government-industry connections but were welcomed by the European Commission. Katharina and Britta trace a process that unfolded in the wake of the emissions scandal in Germany and ultimately concluded with a strengthening of collective litigation rights at the European level, most importantly through the ‘New Deal for Consumers’ Directive, which established a European collective redress mechanism. Katharina and Britta conclude that in “what seems to be the most important implication of the affair over emissions manipulation in diesel cars, class-action-style-models making it easier to pursue collective redress in civil courts have become a reality, not only in Germany but also at a European level.”

It is no secret that a broad variety of firms divert significant resources into lobbying the European Union’s political institutions. Naturally, scholars have questioned whether or not private companies’ lobbying efforts actually translate into tangible changes in the content of the EU’s legislative output. Their findings suggesting that firms more often than not lose their ‘lobbying battles’ then present a puzzle. Why would firms continue to pour money into lobbying that rarely succeeds? In their article “Does it pay to lobby? Examining the link between firm lobbying and firm profitability in the European Union” published in the Journal of European Public Policy, Adam William Chalmers and Francisco Santos Macedo study the relationship between firms’ lobbying efforts and a success metric arguably closer to their key interests than changing legislative outcomes: profit. Drawing on original data comprising information on the lobbying and financial performance of over 700 firms over four years, Adam and Francisco show that spending more money on lobbying is positively associated with firms’ overall profitability. While private companies’ lobbying may rarely shape EU legislation, evidence suggests “that the institutional structure and lobbying context of the EU, which both requires considerable lobbying expenditures in the form of informational lobbying, and which promotes longer term relationships between lobbyists and public officials, is conducive to seeing financial returns on firms’ lobbying efforts.”

Ever since the British electorate set the United Kingdom on a path to leave the European Union, negotiations between London and Brussels aimed at ensuring that British interests are protected along the way have been anything but the proverbial ‘walk in the park’. Several observers have pointed out that flawed assumptions held by British negotiators about their European counterparts’ willingness to meet the UK’s demands translated into stuttering talks. In their article “Bounded rationality and the Brexit negotiations: why Britain failed to understand the EU” published in the Journal of European Public Policy, Filipa Figueira and Benjamin Martill explore the sources of these biased assumptions. Drawing on evidence from a series of interviews with officials in London and Brussels conducted between 2017 and 2018, Filipa and Benjamin identify several inhibitors of rational decision-making that shaped the UK’s approach to Brexit negotiations, including a reliance on ill-fitting analogies based on past experiences and the exclusion of key sources of reliable information for decision-makers. Filipa and Benjamin conclude that “evidence from the Brexit case suggests adaptation and learning may be more difficult to achieve even in situations of high policy salience, since assumptions become ‘locked in’ and discrepant evidence cast aside.”